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Abstract
We develop a novel stress-test framework to monitor systemic risk in financial systems.
The modular structure of the framework allows to accommodate for a variety of shock scenar-
ios, methods to estimate interbank exposures and mechanisms of distress propagation. The
main features are as follows. First, the framework allows to estimate and disentangle not
only first-round effects (i.e. shock on external assets) and second-round effects (i.e. distress
induced in the interbank network), but also third-round effects induced by possible fire sales.
Second, it allows to monitor at the same time the impact of shocks on individual or groups of
financial institutions as well as their vulnerability to shocks on counterparties or certain asset
classes. Third, it includes estimates for loss distributions, thus combining network effects
with familiar risk measures such as VaR and CVaR. Fourth, in order to perform robustness
analyses and cope with incomplete data, the framework features a module for the genera-
tion of sets of networks of interbank exposures that are coherent with the total lending and
borrowing of each bank. As an illustration, we carry out a stress–test exercise on a dataset
of listed European banks over the years 2008-2013. We find that second-round and third-
round effects dominate first-round effects, therefore suggesting that most current stress-test
frameworks might lead to a severe underestimation of systemic risk.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis has boosted the development of several network-based methodologies to monitor
systemic risk in the financial system (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001; Elsinger et al., 2006; Nier et al.,
2007; Halaj and Kok, 2013; Miranda and Tabak, 2013; Mart´ınez Jaramillo et al., 2014; Markose
et al., 2012; Montagna and Lux, 2014; Battiston et al., 2012b).
A traditional approach towards the quantification of systemic risk is to measure the effects of
a shock on the external assets of each institution and then to aggregate the losses. However, the
crisis has highlighted that stress-testing should also incorporate so called “second-round” effect,
which might arise via interbank exposures, either as losses on the asset side or liquidity shortages
(see e.g. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013) and references therein). For instance,
the recent ECB comprehensive assessment carried out in 2014 (ECB, 2014) goes into this direction
by taking into account counterparty credit risk while the Basel III framework (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, 2010) gives attention to interconnectedness as a key source of systemic
risk.
Some network-based methods focus on the events of a bank’s default (i.e. its equity going to zero)
as the only relevant trigger for the contagion to be passed on to the counterparties. In other words,
an institution that has faced some shocks will not affect its counterparties in any way as long as
it is left with some positive equity. This is a useful simplification which has allowed for a number
of mathematical developments (Hurd and Gleeson, 2011). Because regulators recommend banks
to keep their largest single exposure well below their level of equity, most stress test conducted in
this way yield essentially to the result that a single initial bank default never triggers any other
default. Systemic risk emerges only if, at the same time, one assumes a scenario of weak balance
sheets (Mart´ınez Jaramillo et al., 2014) or a scenario of fire sales (Roukny et al., 2013).
In contrast, both the intuition and the classic Merton approach, suggest that the loss of equity of
an institution, even with no default, will imply a decrease in the market value of its obligations to
other institutions. In turn, this means a loss of equity for those institutions, as long as they revalue
their equity as the difference between assets and liabilities. Therefore, financial distress, meant as
loss of equity, can spread from a bank to another although no default occurs in between. The total
loss of equity in the system can be substantial even if no bank ever defaults in the process. Indeed,
in the 2007/2008 crisis, losses due to the mark-to-market re-evaluation of counterparty risk were
much higher than losses due from direct defaults.2 The so-called DebtRank methodology has been
developed with the very idea to capture such a distress propagation (Battiston et al., 2012b). The
impact of a shock, as measured by DebtRank, is fully comparable to the traditional default-only
propagation mechanisms (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001; Rogers and Veraart, 2013) in the sense that
the latter is a lower bound for the former. In other words, DebtRank measures at least the impact
that one would have with the defaults-only, but it is typically larger and this allows to assign a
level of systemic importance in most situations in which the traditional method would be unable
to do so because the impact would be zero for all banks. DebtRank has been applied to several
empirical contexts (Battiston et al., 2012b; Di Iasio et al., 2013; Tabak et al., 2013; Poledna and
Thurner, 2014; Fink et al., 2014; Aoyama et al., 2013; Puliga et al., 2014) but it was not so far
been embedded into a stress-test framework. In this paper, building on the method introduced in
(Battiston et al., 2012b), we develop a stress-test framework aimed at providing central bankers
and practitioners with a monitoring tool of the network effects. The main contributions of our
2See, as a reference, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, observing that roughly two-thirds of losses
attributed to coun- terparty credit risk were due to CVA losses and only about one-third were due to actual defaults..
http://www.bis.org/press/p110601.htm
2
works are as follows.
First, the framework delivers not only an estimation of first-round (shock on external assets),
and second-round (distress induced in the interbank network) effects, but also a third-round effect
consisting in possible further losses induced by fire sales. To this end we incorporate a simple
mechanism by which banks determine the necessary sales of the asset that was shocked in order
to recover their previous leverage level and assuming a linear market impact of the sale on the
price of the asset. The three effects are disentangled and can be tracked separately to assess their
relative magnitude according to a variety of scenarios on the initial shock on external assets and
on liquidity of the asset market. Second, the framework allows to monitor at the same time the
impact and the vulnerability of financial institutions. In other words, institutions whose default
would cause a large loss to the system become problematic only if they are exposed to large losses
when their counterparties or their assets get shocked. These quantities are computed through two
networks of leverage that are the main linkage between the notion of capital requirements and the
notion of interconnectedness. Third, the framework allows to estimate loss distributions both at
the individual bank level and at the global level, allowing for the computation of individual and
global VaR and CVaR (Table 2). Fourth, since data on bilateral exposures are seldom available,
the framework includes a module to estimate the interbank network of bilateral exposures given
the information on the total lending and borrowing of each bank. Here, we use a combination of
fitness model (de Masi et al., 2006; Musmeci et al., 2013; Montagna and Lux, 2014), for the network
structure and an iterative fitting method to estimate the lending volumes, but alternative methods
could be used or added as benchmark comparison (e.g. the maximum entropy method (Upper and
Worms, 2004; Mistrulli, 2011), or the minimum density method (Anand et al., 2014). Finally, the
framework has been developed in MATLAB and is available upon request to the authors. As an
illustration, we carry out a stress-test exercise on a dataset of 183 European banks over the years
2008–2013, starting from the estimation of their interbank exposures.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.1 we review similar or related work; in Section
2 we describe the main aspects of the framework, providing an outline of the distress process,
a discussion of the main variables, and the framework’s building blocks; in Section 3, we show
how the framework can be applied to a dataset and we discuss the main results of this exercise;
in Section 4, we review the main contributions and introduce elements for future research. In
Appendix A, we provide the technical details of the distress propagation process, including how
the key measures are computed; in the Appendix B, we described the data we used for the exercise
in Section 3 and, last, in Appendix C, we outline the network reconstruction methods when only
the total interbank lending/borrowing for each bank is known.
1.1 Related work
The recent – and still ongoing – economic and financial crisis has made clear the importance of
methods of early detection of systemic risk in the financial system. In particular, researchers, regu-
lators and policy-makers have recognized the importance of adopting a macroprudential approach
to understand and mitigate financial stability. Notwithstanding the many efforts (Kolb, 2010),
regulators still lack an adequate framework to measure and address systemic risk3.
The traditional micro-prudential approach consists in trying and ensuring the stability of the
banks, one by one, with the assumption that as long as each unit is safe the system is safe.
3In the following, we refer to systemic risk to indicate the probability that a large portion of the financial system
is in distress or collapses.
3
This approach has demonstrated to be a dangerous over-simplification of the situation (Borio,
2003). Indeed, we have learned that it is precisely the interdependence among institutions, both
in terms of liabilities or complex financial instruments and in terms of common exposure to asset
classes what leads to the emergence of systemic risk and makes the prediction of the behaviour
of financial systems so difficult (Battiston et al., 2012a). While risk diversification at a single
institution can indeed lower its individual risk, if all institutions behave in a similar way, herding
behaviour can instead amplify the risk. Clearly, if all banks take similar positions, the failure
of one bank can cause a global distress (Brock et al., 2009; Stiglitz, 2010; Caccioli et al., 2013),
because of the increased sensitivity to price changes (Patzelt and Pawelzik, 2013). To add more
complexity, the causes of market movements are still under debate (Cutler et al., 1989; Cornell,
2013), suggesting that exogenous instabilities add up to endogenous ones (Danielsson et al., 2012).
The tension between individual regulation and global regulation (Beale et al., 2011) poses a series
of challenging questions to researchers, practitioners and regulators (BoE, 2013).
Traditionally, well before the recent crisis, it was argued that systemic risk is real when conta-
gion phenomena across countries take place (Krugman et al., 1991; Bordo et al., 1995). In this
spirit, a series of studies dealt with the description of systemic risk in the financial system from the
perspective of the contagion channels across balance-sheet of several institutions (Elsinger et al.,
2006; Gai et al., 2011; Miranda and Tabak, 2013; Huang et al., 2013; Montagna and Lux, 2014;
Glasserman and Young, 2015). In particular, some focus was drawn upon the topology of connec-
tions (or the network (Caldarelli, 2007)) between institutions (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001; Roukny
et al., 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2013).
In this way, the problem of analysing systemic risk splits in two distinct problems (Cont et al.,
2010). First, the problem of understanding the role of an opaque (if not unknown) structure of
financial contracts (Caldarelli et al., 2013) and, second, the problem of providing a measure for the
assessment of the impact of a given shock (Battiston et al., 2012b). As for the first problem, the
obvious starting point is to consider the structure of the interbank network (de Masi et al., 2006;
Iori et al., 2008; May and Arinaminpathy, 2010; Mistrulli, 2011; Roukny et al., 2014), with the
aim of possibly extracting some early warning signals (Squartini et al., 2013). While many argued
that the network structure can be intrinsically a source of instability, it turns out instead that no
specific topology can be considered as systematically safer than the others (Roukny et al., 2013).
Indeed, only the interplay between market liquidity, capital requirements and network structure
can help in the understanding of the systemic risk (Roukny et al., 2013; Loepfe et al., 2013). For
the second problem, researchers have tried to describe the dynamics of propagation of defaults
with various methods, including by means of agent-based models (Geanakoplos et al., 2012) or by
modelling the evolution of financial distress across balance-sheets conditional upon shocks in one
or more institutions (Battiston et al., 2012b).
From the perspective of financial regulations, capital requirements represent the cornerstone of
prudential regulations. Institutions are required to hold capital as a buffer to shocks of any nature.
The most used risk measures (such as Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall) are indeed related to
the quantity of cash each individual bank needs to set aside in order to cover the direct exposures
to different types of risk. In such manner, the indirect exposures arising from the interconnected
nature of the financial system are not considered. Interconnectedness, though, is now entering
the debate on regulation: for example, the definition of “Global Systemically Important Banks”
(G-SIBs, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011) does include the concept of intercon-
nectedness, thereby measured as the aggregate value of assets and liabilities each bank has with
respect to other banking institutions. Although this represents a fundamental step towards the
inclusion of interconnectedness in assessing systemic risk, a further level of disaggregation would
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be needed. In fact, institutions that are similar in terms of their aggregated exposures (including
those vis-a`-vis other financial institutions), might have completely different sets of counterparties,
therefore implying different levels of systemic impact and/or vulnerability to shocks. Another
important point is that the potential negative effects arising from interconnectedness ought to be
included into the definition of capital requirements.
2 The DebtRank stress-test framework
In this Section, we introduce and describe the DebtRank stress-test framework. One of the main
characteristics of the framework lies in its flexibility along the following four main dimensions.
1. Shock type. The framework can implement different shock types and scenarios (on external
assets).
2. Network estimation. When detailed bilateral interbank exposures are not available, the
framework provides a module to estimate the interbank network from the total interbank
assets and liabilities of each bank,
3. Contagion dynamics. The framework can implement two different contagion dynamics,
distress contagion and default contagion.
4. Systemic risk indicators. The framework returns as output a series of systemic risk
indicators, both at the individual and a the global level. The user can aptly combine this
information to extract the information needed. Several graphical outputs are also available
and represent a key feature of the framework: graphics are specifically designed to capture
relevant information at a glance.
Given the flexibility of the framework and the number of outputs produced, in the remainder of
the Section, we focus on:
1. describing the main features of the DebtRank distress process as the key foundation of the
framework;
2. providing a qualitative description of the main variables of interests;
3. providing a technical summary of the building blocks of the framework, which include the
inputs required, the outputs that can be obtained and the different modules constituting the
framework.
The reader can find detailed information about the process and the main variables of interest in
the methodological appendix A.
2.1 Outline of the distress process
One of the key concerns in the measurement of systemic risk is to quantify losses at the individual
and global level. In particular, DebtRank focuses on the depletion of equity when banks experience
losses in external or interbank assets. We envision a system of n banks (indexed by i = 1, . . . , n)
and m external assets (indexed by k = 1, . . . ,m). The framework features a dynamic distress
model, with t = 0, 1, . . . , T, T + 1, T + 2:
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Table 1: The distress dynamics.
Time Round Effects on balance sheets
t = 0 Baseline Initial allocation
t = 1 First round effects
Shocks on external assets;
immediate write-off on balance sheets
t = 2 Second round begins
Reverberation on the interbank lending network;
banks receive the distress of their neighbors
t = T Second round ends Second round effects
t = T + 1 Third round begins Banks aim at restoring original leverage value
t = T + 2 Third round ends Final effects
Initial configuration. At time t = 0, banks allocate their uses and sources of funding, all vari-
ables at this time represent the initial conditions of the process.
First round. At time t = 1, we assume a negative shock on the value of one or more assets k.
Banks immediately record the loss and, as they have to pay back their liabilities, reduce their
equity level accordingly. We refer to these losses in equity as first round effects.
Second round. Given the equity loss of each bank, the likelihood of a bank repaying its obliga-
tions on the interbank lending market becomes lower, therefore reducing the market value
of its obligations. This triggers effects on the interbank lending network. Indeed, from t = 2
to t = T ≥ 2, we model the propagation of distress in the interbank network. We refer to
the loss on equity at this point as second round effects. At at certain time t = T , the second
round ends.
Third round. From time t = T + 1, the equity level is reduced from the initial configuration and
banks aim at restoring the original leverage levels. In order to do so, they sell external assets
(fire sales). This triggers further effects on the price of external assets and reduces equity
levels to a greater extent. We refer to these losses as third round effects.
Our framework is based on the clear separation between rounds of distress. At each round, the
loss in equity is the key variable in our framework. As a quick reference, a summary of the distress
dynamics is provided in Table 1.
2.2 Measuring systemic risk: the main variables
We now give a brief description of the main variables in the framework, and their interpretation in
terms of systemic risk. As a reference, the reader can find a summary of these variables in Table
2.
Vulnerability As previously noted, the key quantity in the framework is the loss in equity for
each bank at each time t. In terms of systemic risk, however, there is substantial difference between
the loss in equity a bank suffers and the loss in equity a bank induces in the system. We call the
first variable the vulnerability of a bank and the second variable the impact of a bank onto the
system as a whole. More formally, given the equity values at the initial configuration Ei(0), we
define the individual vulnerability hi(t) of bank i at t as follows:
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Table 2: Description of the main variables in the stress-test framework.
Name Symbol Ref. Explanation
Individual
vulnerability at t
hi(t) Eq. 2 Relative loss in equity of bank i (up to time t).
Global
vulnerability at t
H(t) Eq. 3 Relative loss on equity for the whole system (up to time t).
Individual impact DRi Eq. 6
Total relative loss on equity
induced by the default of i on the whole network.
Individual Value
at Risk at t
V aRαi (t) Eq. 13
Value at Risk at level α
for the individual loss distribution of institution i.
Global Value
at Risk at t
V aRαglob(t) Eq. 16
Value at Risk at level α
for the global relative loss distribution on equity.
hi(t) = min
{
1,
Ei(0)− Ei(t)
Ei(0)
}
. (individual vulnerability)
The bank defaults when hi(t) = 1. Similarly, we can compute the global vulnerability of the
system at time t, by taking the weighted average of hi(t), with weights given by the relative initial
equity:
H(t) =
n∑
i=1
(
Ei(0)∑
j Ej(0)
hi(t)
)
. (global vulnerability)
Impact. Institutions in a financial system are not only systemically relevant in terms of the shock
they receive but also in terms of the loss they cause in case of their default. We call the individual
impact of an institution i, the relative equity loss induced by the default of i (as computed in
Equation 6 in the methodological appendix A). We denote the impact with DRi as it is consistent
with the original DebtRank approach introduced in (Battiston et al., 2012b). Notice that the
measure of impact naturally applies only to the distress a bank induces in the interbank network.
Loss distributions. Conditioning to specific shocks, one can characterize a loss distribution
both at the individual hi(t) and at the global level H(t) at each time t. In this context, “loss” and
“vulnerability” can be used interchangeably. Notice that both the notions of individual and global
loss distribution are key aspects in the quantification of systemic risk. As a matter of fact, a large
fraction of the global losses may be attributable to a few key banking institutions. In particular,
we compute the Value at Risk (VaR) and the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR), as these measures
have emerged as some of the key tools for risk assessment. In our framework, these measures move
towards the inclusion of network effects. In addition, the global loss distribution provides a clear
understanding of the vulnerability of the system as a whole conditional to a specific shock.
Evolution in time. All measures of vulnerability/losses and impact both at the individual and
global level can be tracked over time, therefore providing a way to monitor the evolution of key
figures in terms of systemic risk. In the exercise reported in Section 3, we focus on the monitoring
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of these key variables for a subset of 183 European banks in the years from 2008 to 2013. The
dynamics of these key systemic risk variables allows to capture the evolution of systemic risk in
time.
2.3 The framework’s building blocks
Since the DebtRank stress-test framework features several quantitative and graphical outputs for
input data that are usually publicly available, we now provide a brief, yet comprehensive, overview
of the main building blocks. We use Table 3 as the main reference.
Table 3: Building blocks of the stress-test framework
Building blocks of the stress-test framework
Input Banks’ balance sheets →
i) lending / borrowing (interbank vs total)
ii) external assets (with possible breakdowns)
iii) equity (and reserve capital in general)
Shock scenario → i) one or more banks
ii) one or more asset classes
Output Results of Modelling scenario →
Contagion
DebtRank
Default Cascade
Exposure estimation
Fitness model
(Null models) (1 & 2)
(Maximum entropy)
(Minimum density)
2.3.1 Input
Input - data on balance sheets. The fundamental input data are represented by banks’
balance sheets. In particular, the framework takes the equity, the total asset value and the total
interbank lending and borrowing of each bank as minimal inputs. More granular data on the
structure of external assets are indeed possible (e.g. in case one wants to simulate a shock on a
specific asset class).
Input - Shock scenario. The flexibility of the modeling framework allows for a number of
shock scenarios, including:
1. a fixed shock (e.g. 1%) on the value of all external assets;
2. a shock on the value of all external assets drawn from a specific probability distribution (e.g.
a Beta distribution, which we use in the exercise in Section 3.);
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3. when more detailed information on the holdings in external assets for banks is available, the
shock (either fixed or drawn from a probability distribution) on specific asset classes.4
2.3.2 Output
Output - results As outlined above, the framework allows to compute the main systemic risk
variable for two main types of contagion dynamics:
1. the default cascade dynamics: banks impact other banks only in case of their default (see,
for the technical details, the discussion related to Equation 4 in the methodological appendix
A.)
2. the DebtRank dynamics: banks impact other banks regardless of whether the event of default
occurred. The rationale behind this type of dynamics is that, as banks reduce their equity
levels to face losses, they decrease their distance to default and therefore are less likely to
repay their obligations. In this case, the market value of their obligations is reduced and is
hence reflected on the asset side of their counterparties in the interbank market.
Output - bilateral exposures estimation. As detailed data on banks’ bilateral exposures are
often not publicly available, estimations need to be performed in order to run the framework. Even
though such estimations constitute a key input of the stress test framework in case the exposures
are not known, they constitute an output on their own, because they can be then analyzed with
the typical tools of network analysis. Also, the estimations can serve for two other purposes: i)
as a benchmark for comparison with the observed data, a` la Savage and Deutsch (1960), or ii) for
the estimation of missing data (Anand et al., 2014). From a technical viewpoint, the methodology
we use to estimate the interbank network is based on the so called “fitness model” (de Masi et al.,
2006; Musmeci et al., 2013). The technical details are reported in Appendix C.
3 The framework at work: results of a stress test exercise
In order to show how the framework works and what type of outputs are available, in this Section
we apply the framework to a specific dataset of 183 EU banks for the years 2008 − 2013. More
details on the dataset are available in Appendix B. In brief:
1. We collect yearly data on equity, external assets, interbank assets and liabilities for the set
of banks under scrutiny;
2. We estimated the exposures by combining the fitness model and an interative fitting pro-
cedure (Appendix C), generating (for each year) 100 networks compatible with the total
interbank borrowing and lending of each bank at end-year;
3. We then ran the stress-test in order to obtain the main systemic risk variables for all years.
When not explicitly specified, the statistics reported in this Section are computed by taking
the median value of the 100 networks.
In the remainder of this Section, we describe the main results, including some key charts and
figures, in order to show part of the graphical output of the framework.
4This also allows to run the stress-test by applying heterogenous shocks with a pre-determined correlation
structure. However, we will tackle this issue more specifically in future works.
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Figure 1: Systemic vulnerability and individual impact over time. (Left) Plot of the global vulner-
ability in time and its decomposition w.r.t. the different rounds. (Right) Individual impact over
time. In order to show that impactful institutions keep being so during the years, colors reflect
the impact in 2008.
3.1 Vulnerability and impact
Figure 1 provides an overview of the response of the reconstructed financial networks and its
individual elements to the distress scenarios simulated. The chart on the left shows the dynamics
of global equity losses (H) from 2008 to 2013, the values reported are the median value of H across
the 100 networks in the Monte Carlo sample and are computed for a common shock of 1% on the
external assets. The chart also offers a deconstruction of the losses, according to if they are caused
by the first (external assets shocks), second (reverberation on the interbank lending network), and
third (fire sales) round of distress propagation. The relative losses in equity due to the second
and third rounds are substantial, implying that an assessment of systemic risk solely based on
first order effects is bound to underestimate potential losses. The chart on the right shows the
evolution of the impact for each of the 183 banks in the sample throughout the years. Each line is
the median of the impact calculated over the 100 networks in the ensemble. The plot clearly shows
a general decrease in the systemic impact for the individual institutions over time. In order to
visually capture the persistency over time of banks with higher or lower impact, the colours reflect
the level of the average impact computed over the years. In particular, red lines are associated to
banks that consistently show a high impact. Conversely, blue lines are associated to banks that
have a consistently low impact. We observe a certain level of stability of the relative levels: banks
which show a higher systemic impact tend to do so throughout the years.
From a systemic risk perspective, it is of particular interest to compare the two main systemic risk
quantities associated to each individual bank: the vulnerability to external shocks and the impact
of a bank onto the system in case of its default. By jointly analyzing these two quantities, we divide
institutions into four main categories: i) high vulnerability / high impact, ii) high vulnerability /
low impact, iii) low vulnerability / low impact, iv) low vulnerability / high impact.
Results for this exercise are reported in Figure 2. The graphs report a plot of the vulnerability
hi at the second round versus the impact DRi for each year in the sample. The [0, 1]× [0, 1] square
is divided into four quadrants, which correspond to the aforementioned four categories. Interbank
leverage and total asset size are respectively visualised by node colour (red implies high leverage,
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Figure 2: Individual vulnerability vs individual impact (2008 and 2013) Circle size reflects asset
size, colors reflect the magnitude of the interbank leverage. The four quadrants divide the banks
into four categories.
blue otherwise) and node size. Both interbank leverage and asset size appear to be associated
with high values of vulnerability and impact. We observe an interesting phenomenon: in 2008, a
high number of large (in terms of asset size) institutions are both highly vulnerable (up to their
default) and impactful (up to 70% of the total initial equity). Their systemic relevance is therefore
extremely high, as they have higher likelihood to receive distress. In turn, once the distress has
been received, they would have a great impact on the rest of the system. The situation improves
over time and, in 2013, no bank is in the upper right quadrant. Some financial institutions retain,
though, very high vulnerability and significant impact. A financial institution that can cause a
global relative equity loss of 10% still acts as a source of systemic risk not to be ignored. However,
some large institutions are still prone to receive high level of distress, and nevertheless keep a
significant impact (up to 20% on the rest of the system). We also notice that those institutions
which are both vulnerable and impactful are generally large and very large ones in terms of asset
size.
3.2 Decomposition of 1st and 2nd round effects
Figure 3 shows a way of visualizing the decomposition of first and second round effects. Again,
we compare the years 2008 (left) and 2013 (right). The x-axis plots the losses at the first round
and y-axis the losses after the second round. Since the losses at the second round include the ones
at the first, points must lie above the line bisecting the first quadrant. Nodes lying on the line
itself are isolated in all the artificially generated networks. We observe a significant reduction in
the effects. As usual, the color reflects the interbank leverage and circle diameter the asset size.
Consistently with the findings in Appendix A, nodes with higher interbank leverage typically suffer
more losses in the second round.
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Figure 3: Decomposition of first and second round effects in 2008 and 2013 for an initial shock on
external assets r(1) = 0.01. The names of the first top ten institutions by asset size for each year
are shown.
3.3 Distribution of losses
3.3.1 Global losses
We evaluate a distribution of relative global equity losses by simulating 150 different systemic
shock levels drawn from a Beta distribution.5 Figure 4 shows the distributions resulting by taking
into account first only (blue lines) and second round (red lines) distress propagation effects for
the years 2008 and 2013. Vertical lines indicate VaR values at 95%, dashed lines are CVaR at
the same level (see A.4 for details). An extremely important consideration can be made from this
figure: accounting for second order effects greatly increases the likelihood of having larger global
equity losses, thus shifting VaR values towards the right. In 2008, a scenario where only first order
distress is induced leads to a relatively low VaR level. This, instead, reaches a much higher value
after the second round effect is added. A similar, though less extreme, pattern is found in 2013.
The observed VaR shift phenomenon is another compelling piece of evidence stating that systemic
risk measures ought to take into account network effects.
3.3.2 Individual losses
Figure 5 shows yet one of the outputs of the framework: the distribution of losses can be obtained
for each individual bank. Here, we focus on two large institutions (by asset size): HSBC (which
ranks first by asset size in 2013) and Intesa SanPaolo (which ranks thirteenth in 2013). Despite
the difference in asset size, the original distance in the levels of VaR for the first round (0.15 vs
0.14) become much more relevant when second round effects are considered (0.28 vs 0.22). The
example shows that significant differences in terms of standard risk measures are missed out if we
neglect second-round effects.
5The parameter of the Beta distribution chosen are a = 4 and b = 8 respectively. The distribution has been
then truncated in order to attain a maximum value of 0.015 = 1.5% and a minimum of 0.001 = 0.1%.
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Figure 4: Distribution of global relative losses (global vulnerability) in 2008 and 2013. Relative
shocks on value of external assets drawn from a Beta distribution with parameters [4, 8] and
truncated with a maximum of 0.015.
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Figure 5: Individual losses for two large banks. (Left) The chart reports the loss distribution for
Intesa SanPaolo and (right) HSBC.
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4 Discussion and concluding remarks
The exercise carried out in Section 3 shows how the framework can be used to compute a variety
of individual and global quantities that are relevant to systemic risk. The framework allows for
a number of additional analyses which are not reported in detail in this paper for the sake of
conciseness. For instance, Figure 6 represents one of the outputs of the framework in terms of
network visualization and allows to compare the network position of individual institutions with
other information. In this example, the interbank exposures among the top 18 banks by total asset
size in 2008 (left) and 2013 (right) are considered. The position of a bank in the chart is determined
by its impact: the higher the impact, the more central the bank is located in the circle. The bubble
size is proportional to total asset size of the bank, while the color encodes its vulnerability (on a
scale from blue to red, red nodes are more vulnerable). It is worth mentioning the discussion on
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Figure 6: Network visualization of the top 18 institutions by asset size in 2008 and 2013. Nodes
are positioned on the concentric circles according to their Katz centrality.
the determinants of the systemic importance of financial institutions. In particular, one question
is to what extent the asset size of an institution can be a good predictor of the impact of the bank
on the system as a whole, and how much we should instead consider the position of the bank in
the interbank network. Previous work have found that, although systemically important banks
are typically among the large banks, banks with similar size can have very different impact on the
system, in case of default (Di Iasio et al., 2013). In line with those results, in our exercise, we find,
loosely speaking, that asset size is not a good predictor of impact (i.e. the Pearson correlation
between asset size and individual impact, as measured by DebtRank, for the top 30 institutions
by total assets, each year is quite low, around 0.5).
To summarize, this paper presents a stress-test framework focused on the evaluation of network
effects in systemic risk. We have illustrated how to carry out a stress-test exercise on a dataset
of 183 European banks over the years 2008-2013. The code underlying the framework has been
developed in MATLAB and is available upon request to the authors.
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The notion of interconnectedness has already entered the debate on “Global Systemically Impor-
tant Banks” (G-SIBs, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). However, this notion has
been meant so far in an aggregate sense, without fully recognizing that institutions with similar ag-
gregated exposures can have very different levels of systemic impact and/or vulnerability to shocks.
Indeed, a central notion in our framework is the one of leverage networks, i.e. the set of leverage
relations among banks’ balance-sheets and among banks and assets. The effect of these relations
is the key starting point to monitor systemic risk from a network perspective. Accordingly, our
framework allows to track separately the magnitude of the so-called first, second and third round
effects, a feature that is particularly important in the discussion of future stress-tests at national
and international level. In this respect, in line with previous work on German interbank data (Fink
et al., 2014), we find that the second-round effect is at least as large as the first-round effect.
Notice that by adopting traditional analyses based on default-only mechanisms (Eisenberg and
Noe, 2001; Rogers and Veraart, 2013), we would instead find very limited second round effects.
There are two main reasons for this discrepancy. First, in a default-only framework the propagation
of distress only occurs in the case of outright default. For example, in order to trigger any second
round effect, at least one default in the first round is necessary: this would in turn imply that an
initial shock needs to be at least as large as the reciprocal of a bank’s leverage (see Appendix A).
In order for the second round to be significant, there would need to be a large number of defaults
in the first round. Indeed, banks are recommended to keep their single largest exposure well below
their capital so that a necessary condition for second round losses is the default of at least two of
their counterparties. However, in the practice, banks regularly re-evaluate their mark-to-market
exposures to their counterparties in order to take into account the changes in their probability of
default (i.e. Credit Valuation Adjustment; see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015).
Indeed, DebtRank captures the effects of this adjustment in a recursive way. The second reason for
the discrepancy arises from the fact that, in Eisenberg and Noe (2001), while the recovery rate on
interbank assets is determined endogenously, the recovery rate on the external assets is assumed
to be one. Although this assumption has been relaxed in (Rogers and Veraart, 2013), very large
shocks at the first round are still necessary to trigger any second round. In contrast, the dynamics
of DebtRank assumes zero recovery rate on interbank assets, which is a realistic assumption in the
short run. Future work will aim at bridging these two paradigmatic approaches.
In the framework, we further compute a series of systemic risk variables, along with their evolu-
tion over time, thus showing the dynamics of systemic risk in the financial system. In this respect,
there is an added value in looking at quantities such as impact and vulnerability of financial
institutions in combination, since systemic risk emerges when institutions that are systemically
important become also vulnerable. While the results illustrated here have been obtained assuming
the distress propagation mechanism of DebtRank (Battiston et al., 2012b), other mechanisms can
also be used in the framework and compared.
One of the obstacles in estimating network effects is the limitation in the availability of interbank
exposures data. In order to address this issue, our framework allows to generate sets of interbank
networks that satisfy the constraints on the total lending and borrowing of each bank. In this
way, we can gain insights on the possible range of variation on systemic risk, due to differences in
key network quantities. For example, one could tune the density parameter to assess whether this
has an impact on the levels of systemic risk (see Appendix C), or use various interbank network
formation models (see, e.g. Ha laj and Kok, 2015).
Overall, our aim is to enrich the set of existing tools by integrating the estimation of network
effects with risk measures that are familiar to regulators and practitioners. The most used risk
measures (such as Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall) look at the buffer that each individual
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bank needs to set aside in order to cover the direct exposures to different types of shocks. In
contrast, the indirect exposures arising from the interconnected nature of the financial system
are typically not considered in such measures. In this respect, our framework allows to estimate
individual and aggregate banks’ loss distributions conditional to both direct shocks and indirect
shocks on other banks.
A Methods
In this methodological Appendix, we provide the technical details of the process underlying the
stress-test framework. In order to bridge between capital requirements and the network structure,
we build on the common notion of leverage and define two leverage networks, which reflect a more
granular representation of banks’ balance sheets.
A.1 Balance-sheet dynamics
In the framework, we consider a financial system composed of n institutions (banks). Each insti-
tution i in the system can invest in either m external assets or in the funding of the other n − 1
financial institutions. The focus of our analysis is on the dynamics of the balance sheets of each
institution (at each time t = 0, 1, 2, . . .) and, in particular, of their equity levels. The balance sheet
is modelled as follows: Ei(t) is the equity value of institution i at time t, Ai(t) is value of its total
assets and Di its total liabilities. Consistently with much of the literature, we assume that assets
are marked-to-market whereas liabilities are written at their face value. We can classify assets
and liabilities into external and interbank. In particular, we consider the n× n interbank lending
matrix, whose element Abij is the amount bank i lends to bank j in the interbank market and the
n×m external assets matrix, whose element Aeik is the amount invested by bank i in the external
asset k. The sum Abi =
∑n
j=1A
b
ij is the total amount of interbank assets of bank i and the sum
Aei =
∑m
k=1A
e
ik is the total amount of external assets of bank i. In this framework, we consider
external liabilities as exogenous and do not specifically model them: to simplify the notation,
these liabilities do not carry a time index. The balance sheet identity at each time t = 0 reads:
Ai(t) = Di(t) + Ei(t), or, equivalently, A
e
i (t) + A
b
i(t) = D
e
i + D
b
i (t) + Ei(t). We define the total
leverage of bank i at time t as the ratio between its total assets and its equity: li(t) = Ai(t)/Ei(t),
which can disaggregated into its additive subcomponents:
li(t) =
Ai(t)
Ei(t)
=
=
Abi1(t) + . . .+ A
b
ij(t) + . . .+ A
b
in(t) + A
e
i1(t) + . . .+ A
e
ik(t) + . . .+ A
e
im(t)
Ei(t)
= lbi1(t) + . . .+ l
b
ij(t) + . . .+ l
b
in(t) + l
e
i1(t) + . . .+ l
e
ik(t) + . . .+ l
e
im(t) (1)
where the element lbij(t) = A
b
ij/Ei(t) is the leverage of bank i towards bank j at time t and the
element leik(t) = A
e
ik/Ei(t) is the external leverage of bank i with respect to the external asset
k. By considering these two matrices as weighted adjacency matrices, we can then envision two
leverage networks : i) a mono-partite interbank leverage network and ii) a bipartite external leverage
network. By summing along the columns of these matrices, we can obtain the total interbank
leverage lbi (t) =
∑
j l
b
ij(t) (the interbank leverage out-strength) and the total external leverage
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lei =
∑
k l
e
ik(t) (the external leverage out-strength). These quantities are the key variables in our
framework. In particular, we will show that interbank and external leverage produce compounded
effects when the dynamic of losses for the second round is considered.
A.2 The distress process
As banks deplete capital in order to face losses in both interbank and external assets, in the stress-
test framework we are mainly concerned with the dynamics of the relative loss in equity for each
institution, with respect to a baseline level at t = 0. This dynamics is captured by the following
process:
hi(t) = min
{
1,
Ei(0)− Ei(t)
Ei(0)
}
, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (2)
which represents the individual cumulative relative equity loss in time. We assume that either no
replenishment of capital or positive cash flow are possible, therefore Ei(t) ≤ Ei(t− 1), ∀t. In this
way, the relative equity loss is a non-decreasing function of time. Further, hi(t) ∈ [0, 1] ∀t. A bank
defaults ( i.e. the bank reaches the maximum distress possible) if hi(t) = 1. When hi(t) = 0 the
bank is undistressed. All values of hi(t) between 0 and 1 imply that the bank is under distress.
Similarly, we can compute the global cumulative relative equity loss at each time t as the weighted
average of each individual level of distress:
H(t) =
∑
i
wi hi(t) (3)
where the weights are given by wi = Ei(0)/
∑
j Ej(0), i.e. the fraction of equity of each bank
at the baseline level (t = 0). Notice that hi(t) is a pure number and so is H(t). The monetary
value (e.g. in Euros or Dollars) of the loss can be obtained by hi(t)× Ei(0) (individual loss) and
Hi(t)×
∑
iEi(0) (global loss).
Using the terminology introduced in the main text, Equations 2 and 3 allow to measure the indi-
vidual and global vulnerability respectively. The entire distress process featured in the framework
can be outlined in the following steps.
A.2.1 First round: shock on external assets
Let pk(0) be the value of one unit of the external asset k. At time t = 1, a (negative) shock
rk(1) =
pk(0)−pk(1)
pk(0)
on the value of asset k reduces the value of the investment in external assets of
bank i by the amount:
∑
k rk(1)Aik =
∑
k rk(1) likEi = Ei
∑
k rk(1) lik. Banks record a loss on
their asset side that, provided the hypothesis that assets are mark-to-market and liabilities are at
face value, the loss needs to be compensated by a corresponding reduction in equity:
Aeik(0)− Aeik(1) =
∑
k
rk(1) A
e
ik(0) = Ei(0)− Ei(1)
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The individual and global relative equity loss at time t = 1 can be obtained as follows:6
hi(1) = min
{
1,
∑
k
likrk(1)
}
and H(1) =
n∑
i=1
wi hi(1),
which shows how the initial shock on each asset k is multiplicatively amplified by the external
leverage on that specific asset. This leads to a straightforward interpretation of the leverage
ratio. Indeed it is immediate to prove that the reciprocal of the leverage ratio corresponds to the
minimum shock rmini that leads bank i to default (this applies to all summands l
e
ik e l
b
ij in Equation
1). Since the single largest exposure is typically smaller than the equity, it is likely that defaults
and large losses originate by different combinations of shocks affecting the different external assets.
In the absence of detailed data on the exposure to different classes of external assets, we assume a
common negative shock r(1) on the value of all external assets. This assumption can be interpreted
in two alternative ways. First, we can envision a common small shock to all asset classes, as in
times of general market distress. The second way is that of a large shock to specific asset classes
held by all banks (e.g. sovereign on a class of countries, housing shocks, etc.).
We can therefore drop the index k in the summation and write: hi(1) = min{1, lei r(1)}. At this
point, the initial loss reverberates throughout the interbank network.
A.2.2 Second round: reverberation on the interbank network
The DebtRank algorithm (Battiston et al., 2012b) extends the dynamics of default contagion into
a more general distress propagation not necessarily entailing a default event. In other words,
shocks on the asset side of the balance sheet of bank i transmit along the network even when
such shocks are not large enough to trigger the default of i. This is motivated by the fact that,
as i’s equity decreases, so does its distance to default (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003) and, consistently
with the approach of Merton (1974) the bank will be less likely to repay its obligations in case of
further distress, therefore implying that the market value of i’s obligations will decrease as well.
Consequently, the distress propagates onto its counterparties along the network. If we denote
the market value of the obligation with Vt(Aij),
7 then above argument implies that the distress j
propagates onto its lender i can be expressed, in general terms, as the relative loss with respect to
the original face value
Aij−Vt(Aij)
Aij
= f(hj(t− 1)). By summing over all obligors, the relative equity
loss of each bank i at time t = 2, 3, . . . is described by:
hi(t) = min
1, ∑
j∈SA(t)
lijf(hj(t− 1))
 (4)
where SA(t) is the set of active nodes, i.e. nodes that transmit distress at time t. The choice
of the set of active nodes at time t, SA(t), is a peculiarity of DebtRank. In fact, Equation 4 is
6We assume that the write off on the value of external assets is entirely absorbed by the equity; the derivation
is straightforward:
hi(1) = min
{
1,
Ei(0)− Ei(1)
Ei(0)
}
= min
{
1,
∑
k A
e
ik(0)rk(1)
Ei(0)
}
= min
{
1,
∑
k
(leik × rk(1))
}
.
7From a balance sheet perspective, Aij is the element standing on the liability side of j (i.e. the face value
established at time 0), whereas Vt(Aij) is the value (mark-to-market) at time t written on the asset side of i.
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of a recursive nature and therefore needs to be computed at each time t by considering the nodes
that were in distress at the previous time. Since the leverage network can present cycles, the
distress may propagate via a particular link more than once. Although this fact does not represent
a problem in mathematical terms, its economic interpretation is indeed more problematic. In
order to overcome this problem, DebtRank excludes more than one reverberation. From a network
perspective, by choosing the set SA(t) we exclude walks that count a specific link more than once.
The process ends at a certain time T , when nodes are no longer active.
The functional form of f(·). The choice of the function f(·) deserves further discussion. In
fact, a correct estimation of its form would require an empirical framework which should take into
account the probability of default of j and the recovery rate of the assets held by i. However,
the minimum requirement that f(·) needs to satisfy is that of being a non-decreasing relation
between hi and the losses in the value of its obligations. More specifically, we can hypothesize
that small values of hi may have little to no effect on the market value of i’s obligations, whereas
extremely large losses would settle the value of i’s obligations almost close to zero: the relationship
is therefore necessarily non-linear and f(·) is likely to be a sigmoid-type of function. In view of
this, although further work will deal with the analysis of more refined functional forms, we hereby
present two main forms, referring to the following two specific dynamics of distress:
Default contagion. In this case, in line with a specific stream of literature, (Eisenberg and Noe,
2001), only the event of default triggers a contagion. The function f(·) is therefore chosen
as the indicator function over the case of default f(hi(t)) = χ{hi(t)=1}.
DebtRank. The characteristics of f(·) imply the existence of an intermediate level where f(·) can
be approximated by a linear function. By choosing the identity function f(hi(t)) = hi(t), we
obtain to the original DebtRank formulation (Battiston et al., 2012b). This functional form
will be the one we use the most in the framework and the exercise.
For the sake of clarity, in the remainder of this Section, we consider only the latter functional
form. However, in the framework, stress tests can be easily carried out for both cases.
Vulnerability. We are now ready to compute the vulnerability (both individual and global) and
the impact (at the individual level). The individual vulnerability hi(t) can be easily computed by
setting f(hj(t)) = hj(t) in Equation 4. The global vulnerability is then given by H(t) =
∑
i hi(t)wi.
Even though the framework can take as input any type of shocks, we focus briefly on the case in
which the external assets of all banks are shocked: in this case all banks transmit distress at time
t = 1 and, given the choice of the set SA(1), the process indeed ends at time T = 2. We can hence
derive a closed-form solution for the individual vulnerability after the second round:
hi(2) = min
{
1, lei r(1) +
∑
j
lbijl
e
jr(1)
}
, (5)
which elucidates the compounding effect of external and interbank leverage. If the shock r(0) is
small enough not to induce any default, then 5 can be rewritten as:
hi(2) = l
e
i r(1) +
∑
j
lbijl
e
jr(1) = r(1)
(
lei +
∑
j
lbijl
e
j
)
19
Impact. DebtRank, in its original formulation (Battiston et al., 2012b), entails a stress test
by assuming the default of each bank individually and computing the global relative equity loss
induced by such default. This is indeed what we define as the impact of an institution onto the
system as a whole. Formally, this can be written as:
DRk =
∑
i
hi(T )Ei(0). (6)
Network effects: a first order approximation of vulnerability Equation 4 clearly shows
the main feature of the distress dynamics captured by DebtRank: the interplay between the
network of leverage and the distress imported from neighbors in this network. Further, Equation
5 clarifies the multiplicative role of leverage in determining the distress at the end of the second
round. We now develop a first-order approximation of Equation 5, which will serve the purpose
of further clarifying the compounding effects of external and interbank leverage in determining
distress. For the sake of simplicity, we assume no default, which allows us to remove the “min”
operator. This is a reasonable assumption in case of a relatively small shock on external assets.
We approximate the external leverage of the obligors of bank i by taking the weighted average
(with weights wi) of their external leverages, which we denote by l
e. As
∑
j l
b
ij = l
b
i , we write
hi(2) ≈ lei r+ lbi le r. By denoting with lb the weighted average of lbi , we can approximate the global
equity loss at the end of the second round H(2) as:
H(2) ≈ ler + lb le r (7)
which allows to see how the second-round effects alone can be obtained as the product of the
weighted average interbank leverage and weighted average external leverage. Typically, stress
tests emphasize the effects of the first-round: as we observe, this may potentially bring to a severe
underestimation of systemic risk.
A.3 Third round and fire sales
After the second round, banks have experienced a certain level of equity loss that has completely
reshaped the initial configuration of the balance sheets at time t = 0. Banks are now attempting to
restore, at least partially, this initial configuration. In particular, we assume (Tasca and Battiston,
2013) that each bank i will try to move to the original leverage level li(0). This implies that
banks will try to sell external assets in order to obtain enough cash to repay their obligations and
therefore reduce the size of their balance sheet. Because of the vast quantity of external assets sold
by the banking system in aggregate, the impact on the prices of external assets is also relevant,
which will reduce accordingly. Banks therefore will experience further losses due to fire sales and
we label such losses as third round effects. Here, we provide a minimal model for the scenario
described above.
Consider the leverage dynamics at t = 1, 2, . . . , T, T + 1, T + 2. The leverage at t is
li(t) = l
e
i (t) + l
b
i (t) =
Aei (t) + A
b
i(t)
E(t)
(8)
We assume that, at t = 0, each bank had a quantity of external assets Qi and, without loss of
generality, that the initial price of the asset is unitary (p(0) = 1). Hence, the asset values at t = 0
can be written as Ai(0) = Qi(0) = li(0)Ei(0). The asset price after the first round is therefore
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simply p(1) = p(T ) = (1 − r). Recalling that the first round affects only the external asset and
that the second round affects only interbank assets, the leverage of each bank i immediately after
the second round can be written as:
li(T ) =
(1− r)Qi + Abi(0)− (hi(2)− hi(1))
(1− hi(2))Ei(0) =
=
(1− r)leiEi(0) + lbiEi(0)− (hi(2)− hi(1))Ei(0)
(1− h(2))Ei(0) =
=
(1− r)lei + lbi − (hi(2)− hi(1))
1− hi(2) =
=
(1− r)lei + lbi − hi(2) + lei r
1− hi(2) (9)
where, for ease of notation lei = l
e
i (0) and l
b
i = l
b
i (0). First, we need to prove that the new leverage
levels are higher with respect to the initial conditions. It is easy to prove that li(T ) > li(0) (as
long as i has not defaulted):
(1− hi(2))(lei + lbi − hi(2) + lei r) > (1− hi(2))(lei + lbi )⇐⇒ (1− hi(2))li < li − hi(2)
where li = li(0). The above inequality leads to the condition hi(2)(li − 1) > 0, which is always
verified in our setting.
At t = T + 1, banks attempt to restore the target leverage l∗i = li(0) = l
e
i + l
b
i , by selling a
fraction si ∈ [0, 1] of their external assets at the price (1 − r) and replenish their equity of an
amount Qi(1− r)s. Therefore, we modify Equation 9 as follows:
lei + l
b
i =
(1− si)(1− r)lei + lbi − hi(2) + lei r
(1− hi(2)) + si(1− r)lei
(10)
After some passages, we obtain the value for si:
si =
hi(2)
(1− r)lei
li − 1
li + 1
∈ (0, 1)
which satisfies Equation 10. The relative amount of assets sold is given by ρ =
∑
i siA
e
i∑
i A
e
i
. We further
assume that the simultaneous selling of external assets in the market produces a further linear
impact on the price. Given the impact of fire sales, the new price is further reduced as follows:
p(T + 2) = (1− r)(1− ρη) (11)
and the relative change in price is therefore proportional to the relative change in quantity of sold
assets through a constant η ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, by computing the additional loss given by the decline
in price following Equation 11, we obtain the final individual relative equity loss at t = T + 2:
hi(T + 2) = min {1, hi(T ) + lei (1− r)(1− si)ρη} =
= min
{
1, lei r +
∑
j
lbijl
e
jr + l
e
i (1− r)(1− si)ρη
}
(12)
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and the global equity loss at the third round (assuming no defaults):
H(T + 2) = H(2) + (1− r)ρη
∑
i
(wil
e
i (1− si))
=
∑
i
wi
(
lei r +
∑
j
lbijl
e
jr
)
+ (1− r)ρη
∑
i
(wi l
e
i (1− si))
A.4 Loss distribution
The distress process allows to capture, at each time t, the relative equity loss for both the individual
institution and the system as a whole. This implies the possibility to compute, at each time t,
a (continuous) relative equity loss distribution conditional to a certain shock. The equity loss
distribution can be characterized, for example, by two typical risk measures: Value at Risk (VaR)
and Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) (also known as Expected Shortfall, ES). Since hi(t) and
H(t) are nonnegative variables ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, t, the individual Value at Risk for bank i at time t at
level α is defined as the 1− α quantile (McNeil et al., 2010; Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2011):
V aRαi (t) = inf{x ∈ [0, 1] : P (hi(t) ≤ x) ≥ (1− α)} (13)
and the Conditional Value at Risk for bank i at time t at level α is defined as the expected value
of the losses exceeding the VaR, as:
CV aRαi (t) = E [hi(t)|hi(t) ≥ V aRαi (t)] (14)
Considering the system as a whole, we can likewise analyze the global relative equity losses H(t)
at each time t, therefore obtaining a global VaR:
V aRαglob(t) = inf{x ∈ [0, 1] : P (H(t) ≤ x) ≥ (1− α)}, (15)
and the global CVaR:
CV aRαglob(t) = E
[
H(t)|H(t) ≥ V aRαglob(t)
]
. (16)
B Data collection and processing
Detailed public data on banks’ balance sheets are unavailable, therefore we resorted to a dataset
that provides a reasonable level of breakdown, the Bureau Van Dijk Bankscope database (URL:
bankscope.bvdinfo.com). We focus on a subset of 183 banks headquartered in the European
Union that are also quoted on a stock market for the years from 2008 to 2013. The main criterion
for the selection was that of having detailed coverage (on a yearly basis) for total assets, equity,
interbank lending or borrowing.8 Future work will deal with data at higher frequency (quarterly,
monthly, . . . ). Our interbank asset and liability data include amounts due under repurchase agree-
ments (which are economically analogous to a secured loan) thereby prompting large contagion
8In details: we recorded the fields 1) “Equity”, 2) “Total Assets”, 3) “Total Liabilities and Equity”, 4) “Loans and
Advances to Banks”, 5) “Deposits from other banks” from the Universal Banking Model (UBM) of Bankscope. See
https://www.bvdinfo.com/getattachment/a5a81707-c96d-4525-9142-7c7e607abf56/Bankscope and http://
www.bvd.co.uk/bankscope/bankscope.pdf
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effects. We perfomed a series of consistency checks. In the case of missing interbank lending data
for a bank for less than three years, we proceed with an estimation via linear interpolation of the
data available for the other years (a comparison with the available data gives errors lower than
20%). Since, in general, the correlation between interbank lending and borrowing for all banks
and years is about 70% (with some significant differences), this implies the presence of net lenders
and net borrowers. In view of this, when data on either interbank lending or borrowing are not
available for more than three years, we simply set them equal.
C Network reconstruction
Data on total interbank lending and borrowing are often publicly available, while the detailed
bilateral exposures are typically confidential. However, in this Section, we outline the estimation
procedure adopted in the framework. At each point in time, we create a sample of 100 networks
via the “fitness model”, which is a technique that has recently been used to reconstruct financial
networks starting from aggregate exposures (de Masi et al., 2006; Musmeci et al., 2013; Montagna
and Lux, 2014). The procedure can be outlined as follows:
1. Total exposure re-balancing. Since we are considering a subset of the entire interbank
market, we observe an inconsistency: the total interbank assets A =
∑
iAi are systematically
smaller than the total interbank liabilities L =
∑
i Li for each year (EU banks are net borrowers
from the rest of the world). To adopt a conservative scenario, we assume that the total lending
volume in the network is the minimum between the two (A in the exercise). Let Ai/A and Li/
∑
j Lj
be respectively the lending and borrowing propensity of i.
2. Exposure link assignment. The fitness model, when applied to interbank networks
(de Masi et al., 2006) attributes to each bank a so-called fitness level xi (typically a proxy of its
size in the interbank network). We can estimate the probability that an exposure between i and
j exists via the following formula, pij =
zxixj
1+zxixj
(z is a free parameter). Notice that pij = pji.
Consistently with a recent stream of literature (Musmeci et al., 2013; Montagna and Lux, 2014),
for each bank we take as fitness xi the average between its total lending and borrowing propensity,
implying that, the greater this value, the higher will be the number of counterparties (the degree
of a node). Considering empirical evidence on the density of different interbank networks (in t
Veld and van Lelyveld, 2014), we assume on average a density of 5% (i.e. about 1670 over the
n(n − 1) possible links).9 Since it can be proved that the total number of links is equal to the
expected value of 1
2
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
zxi xj
1+z xi xj
, we can determine the parameter z and compute the matrix of
link probabilities pij. We now generate 100 network realizations. For each of these realizations, we
assign a link to the pair of banks (i, j) with probability pij. The link direction (which determines
whether i or j is the lender or the borrower) is chosen at random with probability 0.5.
3. Exposure volume allocation Last, we need to assign weights to the edges (the volumes
of each exposure). We impose the fundamental constraint that the sum of the exposures of each
bank (out-strength) equals its total interbank asset Ai. To achieve this, we implement an iterative
proportional fitting algorithm on the interbank exposure matrix aij. We wish to estimate the
matrix piij = Aij/A, which is the relative value of each exposure with respect to the total interbank
volume. We begin the estimation pˆiij of piij, at each iteration: (1) pˆi
′
ij =
pˆiij∑
j pˆiij
Ai
A
, i.e. pˆiij is divided
9We have carried out a sensitivity analysis to assess the role of a specific choice of the density level. Increasing
density to 10% does not influence the overall results of the exercise. For example, values for the global vulnerability
at the second round differs only at the third decimal digit.
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by its relative lending propensity and multiplied by the total relative assets of i,; (2) pˆi′′ij =
pˆi′ij∑
i pˆi
′
ij
Li
L
pˆi′ij. We repeated the two steps until
∑
j pˆiij − Ai/A and
∑
j pˆiji − Li/L are below 1%. Last, the
exposure network can be estimated by piij × A.
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